Archive for March, 2010

Recent and Upcoming Work Concerning Philosophy and Information

Monday, March 29th, 2010

Luciano Floridi has recently made available a paper titled Information, Possible Worlds, and the Cooptation of Scepticism, which is part of an upcoming Synthese issue on the nature and scope of information.

Patrick Allo has uploaded some new papers to his site.

Can Misinformation Be Informative?

Wednesday, March 24th, 2010

Can misinformation be informative and if so, how? Here are some thoughts on the matter, with three ways in which misinformation can be considered informative. The first two are simply rehashes of standard facts about truth, falsity and logic explicated in informational parlance. The third is a novel point.

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Information and Information Flow

Sunday, March 21st, 2010

For a decent introduction to theories of information and information flow, with a focus on semantic information and approaches from within philosophy, I recommend Information and Information Flow: An Introduction. Authored by Manuel Bremer and Daniel Cohnitz, it is based on a series of lectures they gave some years ago.

When I first started looking at information, I found this book to be very helpful and informative. One issue I have with the book though is that it seems to have been put together a little too hastily and as a result is somewhere in between a collection of lecture notes and a refined, replete book. Primarily it suffers from some inadequate explanations and some awkward material flow.

The Logic of Semantic Content

Tuesday, March 16th, 2010

In line with recent literature in the philosophy of information, I define semantic content to be meaningful, well-formed data. In this paper, I outline semantic content and then show how Bochvar’s 3-valued logic can be used simply to formally reason about semantic content.

The Logic of Semantic Content

Paraconsistent Semantic Information

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010

One issue with Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s account of semantic information is that it assigns maximal informativeness to contradictions, an issue that has been termed the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox. What happens if we replace the underlying classical logic and probability with the paraconsistent LP (Logic of Paradox)? Does it resolve the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox? Here is an investigation into the matter:

Paraconsistent Semantic Information

Information: A Very Short Introduction is Available

Monday, March 1st, 2010

Information: A Very Short Introduction, Luciano Floridi’s contribution to the ‘Very Short Introductions’ series is now available for purchase:

http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199551378.do?keyword=floridi&sortby=bestMatches

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Information-Very-Short-Introduction-Introductions/dp/0199551375