Weathering the Infostorm

May 5th, 2015

New review of the book Infostorms.

Practical and Philosophical Considerations for Defining Information as Well-formed, Meaningful Data in the Information Sciences

April 25th, 2015

Practical and Philosophical Considerations for Defining Information as Well-formed, Meaningful Data in the Information Sciences

Workshop on Logic and Information

January 21st, 2015

at the Fifth World Conference on Universal Logic.

SEP Semantic Conceptions of Information Entry Revised

January 12th, 2015

Semantic Conceptions of Information [REVISED: January 7, 2015]

What Your Computer Can’t Know

January 8th, 2015

This review by Searle of Floridi’s The Fourth Revolution is available to subscribers only at the New York Review of Books, but a copy can be found as a reading here:

Floridi’s response to Searle and Searle’s response to Floridi’s response can be read here:

Philosophy of Information Discussion Group

January 7th, 2015

Interesting; a subreddit created to host a discussion group for reading Floridi’s The Philosophy of Information:

Philosophy of Information Reports from PhilPapers

December 29th, 2014

Here are some reports generated from the Philosophy of Information section at

DTMD 15 Conference

December 18th, 2014

DTMD 2015 will focus on Information and values: ethics, spirituality and religion.

Seventh Workshop on the Philosophy of Information

December 2nd, 2014

Conceptual challenges of data in science and technology:

Upcoming Talk: Revising beliefs towards the truth

September 10th, 2014

In October I will be heading up to Wollongong to present at Caf├ęDSL, a weekly research seminar hosted by the Decision Systems Lab in the University of Wollongong School of Computer Science and Software Engineering.

Date and Time: Tuesday 21st, October, 2014. 4pm.

Venue: 6.105 – Smart Building

Title: Revising beliefs towards the truth

Abstract: Traditionally the field of belief revision has been mainly concerned with the relations between sentences (pieces of data) and the logical coherence of revision operations without as much concern for whether the dataset resulting from a belief revision operation has epistemically valuable properties such as truth and relevance. Gardenfors for example, who developed the predominant AGM framework for belief revision, argues that the concepts of truth and falsity become irrelevant for the analysis of belief change as “many epistemological problems can be attacked without using the notions of truth and falsity”. However this may be, given that agents process incoming data with the goal of using it for successful action, this lacuna between belief revision and epistemic utilities such as truth and relevance merits attention.

In this talk I address this issue by presenting some preliminary results concerning the combination of formal truthlikeness/verisimilitude measures with belief revision/merging.