Is Information Fundamental?

April 28th, 2014

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/blogs/physics/2014/04/is-information-fundamental/

Sixth Workshop on the Philosophy of Information

April 16th, 2014

http://socphilinfo.org/workshops/wpi6

Top Ten philosophical issues of the 21st Century

March 12th, 2014

According to this list of the top ten philosophical issues of the 21st century, one of them is:

6. Information and misinformation in the information age.
The 21st century threatens to wreak havoc on the social organization of information and knowledge. We are awash in a glut of information coming at us from all sources — some reliable, some unreliable. But the old top-down authorities that once functioned to certify some information as true and other information as false, are quickly being dismantled. How can we distinguish the good from the bad, the wheat from the chaff? We philosophers for a new century thus face epistemological problems hardly imagined by our predecessors.

Special issue on Philosophy in the Age of Information: A Symposium on Luciano Floridi’s The Philosophy of Information

February 20th, 2014

Special issue on Philosophy in the Age of Information: A Symposium on Luciano Floridi’s The Philosophy of Information

Sixth workshop on the philosophy of information

February 17th, 2014

Sixth workshop on the philosophy of information

Logic and Information

February 4th, 2014

New entry at SEP: Logic and Information.

Unusual Truthlikeness Reference

January 26th, 2014

Verisimilitude (or “truthlikeness”) as an alternative to pro and cons: migraine and cluster headache mechanisms

Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument against the KK Principle

December 30th, 2013

Title: Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument against the KK Principle

Abstract: The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle.

11th Annual Formal Epistemology Workshop

December 21st, 2013

http://www.kennyeaswaran.org/few

Infostorms

December 19th, 2013