A small point concerning the derivation of Hintikka’s axiom of transmission in a logic of being informed.
Including Philosophy and/of Information, Logic and Epistemology
A small point concerning the derivation of Hintikka’s axiom of transmission in a logic of being informed.
Just discovered this interesting site: problemata.com
From the about section: “Problemata is a question bank. It is a repository of questions on various topics, together with answers and hints for the questions.”
Here are question lists tagged philosophy of information..
Details for an upcoming talk I am giving:
Title: A Logic for Agent-Oriented Relevance
Abstract: Relevance here is taken to be agent-oriented/epistemic, where the relevance of a piece of information is determined in terms of how well it satisfies an agent’s request, how well it answers their question. A logic is given in which a relevance operator (Ra) is defined and investigated; Rai means something like ‘the piece of information i is relevant to agent a’. The erotetic foundation for this logic is Hintikka’s approach to analysing questions as requests for information in terms of epistemic modal logic, which is then combined with a logic of intention.
Location: Melbourne University Logic Seminar Series, September 17th.
Details for an upcoming talk I am giving. Date and time TBA:
Title: Knowledge and Information
Abstract: Information and knowledge are commonly associated with each other; colloquially, in dictionaries, the two terms are often treated as synonymous. Within philosophy however, information-theoretic epistemology goes beyond this casual, colloquial association. It involves the development of specialised accounts of information and furthermore attempts to develop an explication of knowledge with such accounts, to show how information causes or leads to knowledge. In this presentation I outline and discuss a theory of information and how it is used to develop an information-theoretic epistemology. Information is treated as a fundamental precursor to knowledge, with knowledge encapsulating truth because it encapsulates information, which itself is also veridical by definition.
Have decided to swiftly read through a copy of Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy and Computing, which I have had borrowed out from the library for a while. It was published in 1999 and seems to be a precursor of the establishment of the Philosophy of Information.
One part I found particularly interesting, titled ‘Data, information and knowledge: an erotetic approach’, is a short subsection of the fourth chapter, ‘The digital domain: Infosphere, databases and hypertexts’.
Continue reading “Database, Information and Knowledge (DIK)”
Collections of literature looking at Floridi’s work keep on coming. Firstly, Knowledge, Technology and Policy has a special issue titled “Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Technology: Critical Reflections”. Papers to feature can already be found online: http://www.springerlink.com/content/105285/?Content+Status=Accepted.
Also, the Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence apparently has a special issue coming out titled “Inforgs and the Infosphere: Themes from Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence”.
Just came across some nice posts at the blog ‘On Philosophy’:
‘Information’ also gets its own category in this blog.
New paper in the Journal of Philosophical Logic with a new take on the Scandal of Deduction: The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information. Part of the abstract:
Hence, although analytically true sentences provide no empirical information about the state of the world, they convey analytic information, in the shape of constructions prescribing how to arrive at the truths in question.
Some more material on the matter: