Including Philosophy and/of Information, Logic and Epistemology
I am inclined to think that externalist accounts of knowledge such as Dretske’s and Nozick’s lead to a distinction between knowing that p and knowing that p is true. A recent paper prompted me to write a response in which I try to explicate this idea. Does it sound plausible?
New article over at Philosophy Now: http://philosophynow.org/issues/98/Information_Knowledge_and_Intelligence
Was watching an episode of Futurama, which led me to look up cryonics, which led me to discover the concept of information-theoretic death.
The legendary epistemologist, who was a central figure in bringing the concept of information into philosophy, has sadly passed away.
As a search for ‘Dretske’ on this blog will reveal, his work has been a major influence on my research and features heavily in my thesis.
Here is some information on Dretske at ‘New APPS’: http://www.newappsblog.com/2013/07/fred-dretske-1932-2013.html
A couple of recent articles on the Gettier case:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11023-013-9310-x
Abstract: In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an investigation into some of the logical properties of Dretske’s account of information flow.
http://socphilinfo.org/workshops/wpi5
I have recently been dealing with Unix timestamps and whilst doing some reading up on them became aware of the Year 2038 Problem; interesting enough to warrant a mention in a blog post I thought.